Frederick Torrence v. Shelly Thompson by unknown
2009 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
6-15-2009 
Frederick Torrence v. Shelly Thompson 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2009 
Recommended Citation 
"Frederick Torrence v. Shelly Thompson" (2009). 2009 Decisions. 1182. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2009/1182 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2009 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
ALD-206 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 09-1226
___________
FREDERICK M. TORRENCE, Appellant
v.
SHELLY LEE THOMPSON, Records Supervisor;
JEFFREY BEARD, Secretary of Corrections; RAYMOND SOBINA, Superintendent;
MS VICKIE SABELLA; MS. CARRIE EVERETT; MS. SATTERLEE;
MS. DEB WOODARD; MS. C. KENNEDY; MS. PAULA TOSKI
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 07-00331)
District Judge:  Honorable Maurice B. Cohill, Jr. 
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
June 4, 2009
Before:  SLOVITER, FUENTES AND JORDAN, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed June 15, 2009)
_________
OPINION
_________
PER CURIAM
Appellant Frederick Torrence filed this civil rights action against various prison officials
and employees at SCI-Forest, his current place of confinement.  Therein Torrence raised
    1 Although the District Court’s order is ambiguous as to whether it was treating
Appellees’ motion as one for dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) or as one for
summary judgement, the record demonstrates that the District Court’s implicit
“conversion” of the motion into one for summary judgment was harmless error.  See Rose
v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 342 (3d Cir. 1989).  Both Torrence and the Appellees were on
notice that matters outside the pleadings were being considered, both submitted such
2
the following claims: 1) that Appellees have unlawfully altered his term of incarceration
so that it will not expire until after the sixteen year maximum imposed by the sentencing
court; 2) that Appellees Sabella, Satterlee and Everett have denied him access to the
courts; 3) that Appellee Woodard has been stealing and/or tampering with his legal mail,
and that Appellee Kennedy is complicit in the theft; and 4) that Appellee Toski has
falsified official state records concerning the duration of his sentence.  Appellees filed a
motion to dismiss the complaint, or in the alternative a motion for summary judgment. 
Torrence responded with his own summary judgment motion.  
The Magistrate Judge concluded that Torrence’s complaint should be dismissed for
failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act
(“PLRA”).  The District Court adopted the Magistrate Judge’s report and
recommendation, granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss, or in the alternative their
motion for summary judgment, and denied Torrence’s motion for summary judgment. 
Torrence appealed from the District Court’s order.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of a district court’s grant
of summary judgment is plenary.  See Kaucher v. County of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 422
(3d Cir. 2006).1  Having granted Torrence leave to proceed in forma pauperis, we must
matters, and both were given sufficient time to file responses to the motion and objections
to the Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation, which they did.    
    2 Notably, we recently rejected Torrence’s identical claim in the habeas context.  See
Torrence v. Dep’t of Corr., CA No. 08-3976 (3d Cir. Mar. 24, 2009).
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dismiss his appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) if it is frivolous, i.e., if it has no
arguable basis in law.  See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). 
After considering the record below and his filing on appeal, we find that none of
Torrence’s claims has an arguable legal basis.  First, Torrence’s claim challenging the
legality of his current sentence is barred by the doctrine of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S.
477 (1994), which precludes § 1983 claims whose success “would necessarily imply the
invalidity” of a conviction or sentence that has not already been reversed, expunged,
declared invalid, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus.  Id. at 487.  Torrence specifically challenges the duration of his sentence as
contrary to that imposed by the sentencing court.  This claim, if successful, would “spell
speedier release,” and therefore “lies at the core of habeas corpus.”  Wilkinson v. Dotson,
544 U.S. 74, 82 (2005).  Thus, without one of the aforementioned outcomes (reversal,
expungement, etc.), Torrence is barred from challenging his conviction or sentence via §
1983.2  
Second, we agree with the District Court that Torrence’s remaining claims are barred by
his failure to exhaust administrative remedies.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).  The PLRA
requires prisoners to exhaust any available administrative remedies before bringing an
4action under § 1983 or other federal law.  See id.  To comply with this requirement, a
prisoner must complete the prison’s administrative process.  See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S.
199, 218 (2007).  Any claims not exhausted should be dismissed.  See id. at 221.     
While it appears that Torrence did file grievances against many of the Appellees
concerning the alleged denial of court access and problems with his mail and state
records, there is no indication that he completed the remaining steps for proper
exhaustion.  See Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 232 (3d Cir. 2004).  He concedes as
much, but mistakenly believes that the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement does not apply to
his claims.  Nevertheless, the claims are barred for substantially the reasons given by the
District Court.
Accordingly, because this appeal presents no arguable legal issue, we will dismiss it
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). 
